Blog · Cybersecurity · October 28, 2026 · By Mike Parker, CEO of CRC Cloud

Wire Fraud in Escrow and Title: The 2025 FBI Numbers and the Controls That Help Stop It

Victims reported more than $3 billion in business email compromise losses to the FBI in 2025, and California reported more losses than any other state. Here is what the FBI’s latest report actually counts, what ALTA’s Best Practices 5.0 (effective October 8, 2026) and the FTC Safeguards Rule expect of a title or escrow office, and seven controls that help keep a closing wire from going to a stranger.

This is not legal advice. We are an IT and security provider, not a law firm. Every source is linked so you can read it yourself, and your counsel and your title underwriter have the final word on what applies to your firm.

A closing is an ideal target: a large sum, a fixed date, several parties who mostly know each other by email, and often a buyer who has never wired that much money before. A criminal does not need to break into a bank. One mailbox, or one look-⁠alike address, and one person who trusts an email at the wrong moment is enough.

1. What the FBI’s 2025 report counts

The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received 1,008,597 complaints in 2025, reporting $20.877 billion in losses, a 26% increase from 2024. These are losses victims chose to report, not an estimate of all fraud.

  • Business email compromise (BEC), a scam in which a criminal takes over or imitates a trusted email account to redirect a payment, drew 24,768 complaints and $3,046,598,558 in reported losses, second only to investment fraud. By our arithmetic that is about 10% more than 2024’s $2,770,151,146.
  • California led every state in both complaints (116,414) and reported losses ($3,674,716,305), across all crime types.

One figure is often misread. IC3’s Real Estate category rose to 12,368 complaints and $275,110,419 in 2025, from $173,586,820 in 2024, about 58% by our arithmetic. It is frequently described as closing-⁠wire fraud, but the report defines it as “Loss of funds from a real estate investment or fraud involving rental or timeshare property.” The report’s closing-⁠day examples, in its Recovery Asset Team section, are described as business email compromise incidents (one is labeled “BEC/Real Estate”). In one, a buyer “attempting to close on a property” received a compromised email from the “title company” containing wire instructions for more than $1.3 million to a fraudulent bank account. For a title or escrow office, BEC is the threat to plan around.

The report also notes that “Chat generators can quickly create official-⁠sounding emails,” and that businesses reported more than $30 million in 2025 losses to BEC scams involving AI. A well-⁠written email is no longer a sign that it is genuine.

Read the FBI’s 2025 Internet Crime Report (PDF) →

2. When a wire goes out, minutes matter

The FBI’s Recovery Asset Team, set up in 2018, works with banks and FBI field offices to freeze stolen funds through a process the FBI calls the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. In 2025 it acted on 3,900 incidents involving $1,163,919,846 in attempted theft and froze $679,013,183, which IC3 reports as a 58% success rate. In one of the report’s cases, people closing on a home wired more than $449,000 after an email impersonating their attorneys, and the receiving bank reported “the full amount was still in the account and on hold.”

The report’s advice is short: “If you discover a fraudulent transfer, time is of the essence.” Contact your bank and ask it to recall the funds, then file at ic3.gov with the full transaction details. ALTA’s Rapid Response Plan for Wire Fraud Incidents (version 2.6, March 3, 2026) lays out the order:

  1. Alert your internal team and your underwriter.
  2. Call the sending bank’s fraud department, ask for a recall, and ask it to initiate the Financial Fraud Kill Chain. Then call the receiving bank and ask it to freeze the account.
  3. Warn every party in the transaction, using phone numbers you already trust.
  4. File a complaint with IC3.
  5. Contact local police and the FBI field office.

Read ALTA’s Rapid Response Plan →

3. What ALTA Best Practices 5.0 asks for

The American Land Title Association (ALTA) publishes the Best Practices framework for title insurance and settlement companies. Version 5.0, approved by ALTA’s board on June 23, 2026, took effect October 8, 2026. It keeps seven pillars and makes Vendor Management a pillar of its own (Pillar 7). The wire controls sit in Pillar 2 (Funds and Escrow Trust Accounts) and Pillar 3 (Information Security and Privacy Plans):

  • A written wire transfer procedure, tested at least annually (2.G). For outgoing wires it includes documented procedures to verify instructions “independent of the initial communication,” and those procedures “should include the use of multi-⁠factor authentication” (2.G.1).
  • A documented warning to consumers about the risks of wire fraud on incoming wires, with guidelines to mitigate losses (2.G.2).
  • A written wire fraud response procedure that includes the Rapid Response Plan’s recommendations, reviewed at least annually (2.K).
  • Positive Pay (the bank checks each check or payment against a list you approved) where available for the payment type (2.E), reconciliation of bank activity at least daily, and a three-⁠way reconciliation at least monthly (2.M).
  • Multi-⁠factor authentication (a second proof of identity beyond the password), if available, for systems containing non-⁠public personal information, or NPI (3.A.1); annual training that covers social engineering (3.B.4); and an incident response plan that is periodically tested (3.B.2).

In our reading, 2.G.1 rules out the two shortcuts people take under deadline pressure: replying to the same email thread, and calling the number printed in the email that asked for the wire. Neither is independent of the initial communication.

Read ALTA Best Practices 5.0 at alta.org →

4. The federal floor: the FTC Safeguards Rule

ALTA’s framework is an industry standard. The FTC’s Safeguards Rule (16 CFR Part 314) is federal regulation, and it states: “An entity that provides real estate settlement services is a financial institution.” Among other things, it requires:

  • Multi-⁠factor authentication “for any individual accessing any information system,” unless the person running your security program (the rule’s “Qualified Individual”) approves an equivalent or stronger control in writing.
  • Encryption of customer information held or transmitted, and security awareness training for staff.
  • A written incident response plan, and notice to the FTC “no later than 30 days after discovery” of an event involving the unencrypted information of at least 500 consumers.

Firms holding information on fewer than 5,000 consumers are exempt from a few provisions, including the written incident response plan (16 CFR 314.6). ALTA’s 2.K still asks for a written wire fraud response procedure, and the worst time to write one is during an incident.

Read 16 CFR Part 314 at eCFR →

Seven controls that help stop a diverted wire

  1. Call back on a number you already have. Verify every outgoing wire, and every change to instructions, by calling a number from the file or the signed documents, never one from the message asking for the wire. In our reading, that meets ALTA 2.G.1’s call to verify instructions independent of the initial communication, and it matches the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s advice to homebuyers: “Avoid using phone numbers or links in an email.”
  2. Multi-⁠factor sign-⁠in on every mailbox and the bank portal. A stolen password alone should not open a mailbox that holds closing files. The Safeguards Rule requires multi-⁠factor authentication for anyone accessing your information systems, unless your Qualified Individual approves an equivalent control in writing, and ALTA 3.A.1 calls for it, if available, on systems containing NPI. Turn it on for the bank portal too.
  3. Warn buyers early, and in person or by phone. At opening, tell them your wire instructions will never change by email and give them a number to call. The CFPB’s advice to buyers is blunt: “Never follow instructions contained in an email.” ALTA 2.G.2 expects this warning to be a documented procedure.
  4. Watch the mailboxes, not only the firewall. Look for the signs of a taken-⁠over account, such as sign-⁠ins from unusual places and new forwarding or delete rules, so you find it before the next closing does. After an incident, ALTA’s response plan tells firms to review email logs to see how and when accounts were accessed.
  5. Positive Pay and daily reconciliation. Use them where your bank offers them (ALTA 2.E and 2.M), so an unexpected debit is seen the same day.
  6. A one-⁠page response sheet. Bank fraud-⁠department numbers, your underwriter, the local FBI field office and the IC3 link, with a name next to each step. Review it every year (ALTA 2.K).
  7. Train and test once a year. Annual training that covers social engineering (ALTA 3.B.4), and an annual test of the wire procedure itself (2.G), with the results written down.

Where we fit

We run the technical half of that list for title, escrow and settlement offices across Southern California: multi-⁠factor sign-⁠in, email security, a 24/7 Security Operations Center (SOC) on your mailboxes and endpoints, tested backups, and the documentation a Pillar 3 review asks for. Settlement and escrow work is on Secure IT at $250 per user per month, or $275 with the published 10% GLBA / FTC Safeguards uplift. We align and implement; we never certify ALTA compliance, and your underwriter and assessor keep the sign-⁠off. Details are on our real estate and escrow IT page, our ALTA Best Practices page and the pricing page. For a call-⁠back that worked, read the wire that almost went to a stranger.

Sources: FBI IC3, 2025 Internet Crime Report · ALTA Best Practices 5.0 framework (PDF) · ALTA Best Practices 5.0 release notes (PDF) · ALTA Rapid Response Plan for Wire Fraud Incidents · 16 CFR Part 314 (FTC Safeguards Rule) · CFPB, mortgage closing scams. Checked October 28, 2026.

Quick answers

Escrow and title wire fraud, answered plainly

Is the FBI’s $275 million real estate figure the amount stolen from closings?

No. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) defines its Real Estate category as “Loss of funds from a real estate investment or fraud involving rental or timeshare property.” That category reached 12,368 complaints and $275,110,419 in reported losses in 2025. The report’s closing-⁠day examples are described as business email compromise incidents, a far larger category: $3,046,598,558 in reported losses in 2025.

What does ALTA Best Practices 5.0 require for verifying wire instructions?

Item 2.G calls for a written wire transfer procedure, tested at least annually. For outgoing wires, item 2.G.1 calls for documented procedures to verify instructions “independent of the initial communication,” and says those procedures should include multi-⁠factor authentication. For incoming wires, item 2.G.2 calls for a documented procedure to warn consumers about wire fraud. Version 5.0 took effect October 8, 2026.

Does the FTC Safeguards Rule apply to title and escrow companies?

The rule covers financial institutions under the FTC’s jurisdiction, and 16 CFR 314.2 states that “An entity that provides real estate settlement services is a financial institution.” It requires multi-⁠factor authentication, encryption, staff training and, for an event involving the unencrypted information of at least 500 consumers, notice to the FTC within 30 days of discovery. Whether and how it applies to your business is a question for your counsel.

A wire just went to the wrong account. What do we do first?

ALTA’s Rapid Response Plan gives the order. Alert your internal team and your underwriter. Call the sending bank’s fraud department, ask for a recall, and ask it to initiate the FBI’s Financial Fraud Kill Chain; then call the receiving bank and ask it to freeze the account. Warn the other parties using phone numbers you already trust, file a complaint at ic3.gov with the full transaction details, and contact local police and your FBI field office. In IC3’s words, “time is of the essence.”

Is a call-⁠back still enough now that criminals can clone voices?

A call-⁠back works because you place it, to a number you already had before the request arrived. A call you receive, even in a familiar voice, is not verification; the 2025 IC3 report warns that voice cloning can be used to request wire payments. ALTA’s item 2.G.1 also says the verification procedure should include multi-⁠factor authentication, so the phone call should not be the only check.

See where your closing workflow stands

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